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of U.S. parent firms and find that parents with subsidiaries in low-tax countries have a significantly lower return than parents with high-tax affiliates, which is compatible with profit shifting activities. Grubert and Mutti (1991) use aggregated data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and find that profits on sales of U.S. subsidiaries are higher in low-tax countries than in high tax countries. 4 One of the interesting empirical facts reported in Grubert, Goodspeed und Swenson (1993) was that in 1987, 37% of all non-financial foreign companies had a profitability in terms of total assets that was near to zero. Conversely, only 27% of the domestic firms fell into the same zero range from -2.5% to +2.5%. This issue is taken up in Collins, Kemsley and Shackelford (1997) who concentrate on a sample of foreign-owned and non foreignowned wholesale firms. Their working hypothesis is that if foreign-controlled firms (unlike domestic firms) target zero profitability, then an (exogenous) increase in sales should go along with a smaller increase in profitability compared to domestic firms. The reason is that, while higher sales per se are good for profits, foreign firms would counteract by charging higher prices on intra-firm trade. The findings of Collins, Kemsley and Shackleford do not support the view that foreign controlled firms have a significantly weaker correlation between sales and profits. Based on this observation the authors suggest that systematic differences between domestic and foreign firms rather than income shifting may be the reason for the near zero profitability of many foreign-controlled U.S. firms. 5 Hines and Rice (1994) use 1982 country level data on U.S. affiliates. Their profit measure approximates earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). The empirical results suggest that a one percentage point increase in the host country tax rate reduces reported EBIT of U.S. affiliates by some 3 percent. Finally, Huizinga and Laeven (2005) in a recent paper use a micro data set of European based subsidiaries. Like in Hines and Rice, they 4 consider a cross-section (1999) of firms and study the effect of tax differentials on reported EBIT. Their findings suggest that, while the estimated tax effect is considerably smaller than in Hines and Rice, profit shifting implies a significant revenue loss for high tax countries, Germany in particular.
In this paper, I use the MiDi database of the Deutsche Bundesbank on German inbound and outbound FDI to empirically detect profit shifting. While the above discussion of the literature has made clear that there have been several attempts to empirically identify profit shifting behavior of multinationals, this paper is one of the first micro-based studies with non-U.S. data.
While there are many potential influences on firm profitability, a first hypothesis is that the lower the tax rate of a foreign parent is vis a vis the rate that is applicable to its German affiliate, the more profitable it will be to shift the profits of the affiliate to the home country of the parent. Therefore the profitability of the German affiliate may be positively correlated with the home country tax rate. The paper also looks at the effects that the foreign tax rate has on the profitability of German subsidiaries abroad. A problem here is that the database of German FDI does only record net-of-tax profits of subsidiaries, which at a given pre-tax profitability automatically react negatively to a tax rate increase. Therefore the paper will formulate hypotheses how co-ownership of foreign subsidiaries may influence profit shifting. Under certain conditions the testable hypothesis can be formulated that tax rate changes have a more pronounced effect on wholly-owned subsidiaries as compared to nonwholly owned ones.
The strongest evidence for profit shifting behavior is found for inbound FDI. For profitable subsidiaries that are directly owned by a foreign investor the evidence suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the parent's home country tax rate leads to roughly half a percentage point increase in the profitability of the German affiliate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates a stylized model of profit shifting that will formulate testable hypotheses. Section 3 will briefly 5 introduce the data used in this paper before Section 4 will econometrically analyze German inbound FDI and Section 5 will look at German outbound investment. Section 6 concludes.
A stylized model of profit shifting
One characteristic of the MiDi database, which will be described in more detail in the next section, is that it collects net of tax profits, but no information on pre-tax profits.
Another issue is that MiDi contains little information on the parent firms apart from information on their country of origin. In the light of these data limitations, the following model is set up to develop hypotheses about the observed subsidiaries that indeed can be tested with the help of the German panel data set.
Consider a multinational with a parent firm in country H that owns a single affiliate in the destination country D. Country D taxes reported profits at rate t D . Country H is assumed to exempt foreign profits earned in country D, but taxes domestic profits (and any profits that are shifted into country H) at the rate t H . Since Germany uses an exemption system towards foreign dividends, this assumption is justified if we think of Germany as the home country H. In the case where Germany is acting as the host country (D) the assumption is obviously appropriate in the case of investing countries that also use an exemption system. If the investing country uses a credit system of taxation, then effective exemption still occurs if the parent in the home country is in an excessive credit position. An excessive credit position applies if the foreign taxes underlying the foreign dividends received by a parent are higher than the taxes that would apply had the parent earned the equivalent income at home. Since Germany is a high tax host country, such a situation is the norm and a credit system in the home country of the multinational may then be approximated by an exemption system.
Let there be a level of "true" profits that would prevail in H and G in the absence of profit shifting activities (f H , f D ). The only decision variable of the multinational shall be the net amount S of profits that is shifted from D to country H. A negative amount of S then 6 indicates profit shifting into D. Shifting profits from a high tax jurisdiction to a low tax jurisdiction may save taxes but may also imply a cost for the multinational. For example, special activities may be necessary to hide the profit shifting. I assume that this cost is incurred by the plant that reduces its profitability. This assumption reflects that legal costs that arise when inadequate transfer prices are contested by minority shareholders or tax authorities will occur in the country where profits have been diminished. 6 That is, the cost (1)
Global net of tax profits, which are assumed to form the objective function of the multinational, are given by 
Since the cost of shifting profits depend on the direction of the profit manipulations, two cases have to be distinguished.
Case A: Incentives to shift profits home.
and the first order condition for optimal profit shifting is given by
Using assumptions (1) and implicitly differentiating equation (3) yields the marginal effect of a change in t H on the amount of profit shifting:
The effect of t H on S is as expected: the higher the foreign tax rate the smaller the optimal profit shifting S. The role of λ for the slope dS/dt H is less straightforward. A direct effect of a larger λ is a positive one: a higher share of co-owners increases the gain from any Euro that is shifted. But since
increases in λ, there is also a higher cost of shifting profits home and the net effect is unclear.
The empirical parts of this paper will exploit information on the net of tax profits.
Net-of-tax profits π D and π H in the model are defined by equation (2). Given the slope defined by equation (4), the reaction of the reported net of tax profit in D is may be rewritten
From equation (5), the predicted impact of an increase in H t is positive: ceteris paribus, a tax increase abroad should increase the profitability of a German affiliate. For the later empirical investigation it would be helpful to also have a clear testable prediction about the role of outside shareholders on the size of this tax effect. But, like in equation (4), the role of minority shareholders is ambiguous.
Now consider the impact of a change in the tax rate t D on the reported profits π D .
Again I start from the first order condition (3) to derive the tax rate effect. Differentiation w.r.t. t D yields:
> 0 the slope is positive: a higher host country tax rate leads to additional profit shifting to the parent. Whether this slope should be expected to differ for subsidiaries with different λ is unclear. In equation (7), the first term of the numerator on the r.h.s. is positive, while the second part of the numerator is negative.
The effect of t D on net-of-tax profits can be derived as:
Clearly, the reported profits of the affiliate are expected to be a negative function of t D . The impact of λ on this slope is unclear for two reasons. First, the expression in equation (7), which re-enters if (8) is differentiated w.r.t. λ, cannot be signed. Second, it may be that the pre-tax profit ( )
It is useful to summarize the results for Case A (S > 0) in a non-technical proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: If the profit shifting incentives lead to an upward manipulation of home country profits and a downward manipulation of profits in the host country, then an increase in the host (home) country tax rate should reduce (increase) reported profits of the foreign affiliate. It is theoretically unclear how co-ownership influences the magnitudes of these effects.
Case B: Incentives to shift profits abroad.
If the home country is a high tax country, then the incentives are to shift profits abroad (S < 0) as long as co-ownership is limited:
and implicit differentiation yields:
As long as case B applies, an increase in the home country tax rate will make S more negative, i.e. it will increase profit shifting. Since c H is independent of λ, so is the slope dT/dt H . It is easy to verify, that if profits (f D -S) are independent of the co-ownership variable λ, then the marginal effect of t H on net-of-tax profits will also be independent of λ.
From the first order condition,
if the profit shifting incentives are such that profits are shifted into the affiliate, then an increased taxation of the affiliate will reduce this incentive and make S less negative. Unlike in Case A, the impact of λ can now be signed: ( )
. An increase in the coownership abroad lowers the (absolute) marginal effect of a change in the host country tax.
An intuition behind this is that a fraction of a tax decrease abroad is benefiting other shareholders of the affiliate, which makes this increase less effective for the decisions of the multinational. What are the implications for reported net of tax profitability? From the definition of the affiliate's net of tax profit and c D = 0 it follows:
When t D increases net-of-tax profits fall for two reasons. First, an increase in the tax rate reduces net profitability for a given amount of profit shifting. Second, profit shifting into the affiliate is reduced. Since net of tax profits, which will be the focus of the econometric analysis, are reduced even in the absence of profit shifting it is important to have a testable hypothesis on how the slope in equation (10) depends on λ. If the profit (f D -S) of the affiliate is independent of co-ownership, then from ( )
Increased co-ownership in this case would reduce the impact of tax rate changes on profitability. The above results may be summarized in a non-technical way as follows.
PROPOSITION 2: If the profit shifting incentives lead to a downward manipulation of home country profits and an upward manipulation of profits in the host country, then an increase in the host (home) country tax rate should reduce (increase) reported net-of-tax profits of the foreign affiliate. Under the assumption that pre-tax profits are not dependent on co-ownership, co-ownership should reduce the effect of the host country tax rate on reported net of tax profitability.
The two propositions of this section suggest an asymmetry in the effect that coownership has on the amount of shifting. Given that the profit shifting benefits the affiliate, co-ownership is expected to limit the effect of a tax rate change in the host country on the amount of profit shifting. Intuitively, co-ownership makes this reaction to tax rate changes more expensive because co-owners participate in the increased profit. Conversely, coownership does not necessarily dampen the effects of a tax rate increase in the home country of the parent if the profit shifting is benefiting the parent's profit: while co-ownership per se increases profit shifting incentives, it also implies a resistance to such behavior if it comes at a cost to co-owners.
The data
German investors owning foreign affiliates are legally required to report on their foreign operations if it meets mild size and ownership requirements. Conversely, foreigncontrolled affiliates that operate in Germany have to report on these German operations. The firm reports are the basis for the FDI database of the Deutsche Bundesbank (MiDi). 10 Most of the information in the data refers to a set of balance sheet items. On the liability side there is information on paid-up plus not paid-up equity, capital reserves, loss carry-forwards, current profits net of taxes, debt, liabilities to affiliated companies, and other liabilities. On the asset side, information is collected on fixed assets plus intangibles, financial assets (shares, loans), current assets, and other assets. Important non-balance-sheet items that are collected by the Bundesbank are sales and employees.
An unusual feature of the MiDi balance sheets is that they contain the yearly profit after taxes but before dividend distributions as a separate part of the equity of the firm.
Therefore, the balance sheets provide information on profitability despite the fact that the database does not contain formal profit and loss statements.
Micro data on foreign direct investment are available for years since 1989 but firm identifiers that allow for the tracing of firms over time are available only from 1996
onwards. Nevertheless, the ability to trace firms over up to 8 years is an important advantage over other data sources on FDI and can be used to avoid possible biases from cross-section estimates.
For the purpose of this study, I dropped affiliates if these were either operating in not-for-profit sectors or were not incorporated. I also excluded affiliates in the banking and Table 1 gives an 10 For a detailed description of MiDi see Lipponer (2003) . Ramb and Weichenrieder (2005) use the Bundesbank data to analyze the financial structure of German inward FDI and Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) look at the financing of outward FDI. Buettner and Ruf (2004) use the database to study taxes and location decisions of German multinationals. 11 I also dropped a limited number of observations for which we failed to collect reliable tax rate information on the home country (host country) if the affiliate was located in Germany (abroad Annotation: In each graph, the bold line indicates the return on assets of the median non-financial firm. The two lines below the median line characterise the profitability of the 5th and 25th centile firms, the two lines above the median ratio indicate the 75th and 95th centiles. The left hand diagram refers to the subsample of firms that are directly held by a foreign firm, while the graph on the right hand refers to firms in Germany that are foreign held via a German intermediate company. Annotation: In each graph, the bold line indicates the return on assets of the median non-financial firm. The two lines below the median line characterise the profitability of the 5th and 25th centile firms, the two lines above the median ratio indicate the 75th and 95th centiles. The left hand diagram refers to the subsample of firms that are directly held by a German parent firm, while the graph on the right hand refer to firms that are held via a German-owned intermediate company outside Germany.
Figure 2. Net-of-tax return on total assets: outbound FDI
The fact that this high fraction of firms with more or less zero profitability is pretty constant over the years may fuel the suspicion that advanced tax planning is the reason 14 behind these figures. However, the high fraction of affiliates with zero profitability among indirectly held affiliates at least partly results from specific data problems. While the Bundesbank requests firms to report profits net of taxes but before distributions, some indirectly held firms may fail to report profits that are transferred to the owner on the basis of a corporate contract. Under such a corporate contract the dependent company may agree to transfer all profits and losses to the upper-tier corporation in order to achieve profit and loss consolidation for tax purposes. Consolidation not only requires the existence of such a contract. Germany also restricts consolidation of profits and losses within a group to cases in which a German umbrella company is a majority owner of the dependent firm, i.e. an ownership chain is necessary to establish a profit transfer agreement. While the Bundesbank requires firms to report their profits before distribution, I found strong empirical evidence that many indirectly held firms report figures that are net of profit transfers to the umbrella company and therefore decided to drop indirectly held firms in the analysis of inbound FDI.
Unlike the data for indirect inbound FDI, the profit data for German outbound investment presented in Figure 2 show no bunching at zero profitability and the reporting of zero profitability of indirectly held firms did only weakly correlate with the opportunity to consolidate profits in the relevant host country. For this reason, indirectly held firms were kept in the analysis of outbound investment.
Profit shifting and the profitability of German inbound FDI
Since during the observed period Germany is a high tax country by international comparison, the results derived for the case A (see Section 2, S > 0) are considered relevant for the profitability of inflowing FDI. According to Proposition 1, which assumes profitable multinationals, the foreign corporate tax rate in the country of the parent is then expected to positively affect the profitability of a German affiliate. Whether this effect should be expected to be larger for wholly-owned versus partly-owned affiliates is unclear from Proposition 1.
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To test these implications I use a subsample of incorporated non-financial firms in
Germany that on average across all firm observations show a positive profitability. The endogenous variable is return on assets (ROA), where the return is measured by the net-oftax profits after interest payments (but before dividends). Because of the data problems discussed in Section 3, I concentrate on firms that are directly held by a foreign investor. This variable is also used to create interactive variables. CT_WHOLLY takes on the value of the home country tax rate if the affiliate is wholly owned, and zero otherwise.
Analogously, CTGER_WHOLLY results from multiplying the German corporate tax rate with the variable WHOLLY. DEBT_RATIO is defined as the ratio of debt to total assets that in some cases exceeds 100 percent. This can occur if the firm under consideration has loss carry forwards. To limit the impact of those outliers, the regressions use a winsorized variable, W_DEBT_RATIO. Since random effects models did not pass a Hausman test, the tax effects were estimated using a fixed effects model. Table 3 reports the regression results. The German tax rate could not be entered in the model as all firms are subject to the same rate in a given year and year fixed effects are also included. Model (1) starts with a parsimonious specification using the foreign tax rate, fixed firm and time effects, plus the logarithms of employment, sales, and fixed assets. 14 The variable of prime interest, CT, which measures the corporate tax rate of the foreign parent, turns out significant at the six percent level. The coefficient of 0.049 implies that an increase in the tax rate of the parent by ten percentage points increases the return on assets of a German affiliate by approximately half a percentage point, which amounts to roughly ten percent of the average profitability in the sample. This evidence is in line with profit shifting behavior and Proposition 1. Employment does not enter significantly, while sales enter significantly positive. The size of fixed assets enters negatively, which may result from large depreciation allowances of investing firms.
Model (2) uses the same specification but adds the variable W_DEBT_RATIO. Since additional debt increases the interest cost of an affiliate, the significant negative coefficient is in line with expectations. Inclusion of the debt ratio leads only to a small change in the coefficient of CT. By including the leverage variable the coefficient of CT measures the effect of the tax rate that prevailed when leverage was held constant. Therefore, changes in the profit shifting activities that are induced by a change in CT seem to result only to a limited extent from the use of debt. This is in line with the previous observation that the parent tax rate does not significantly influence the leverage decision of foreign owned affiliates in Germany (Ramb and Weichenrieder 2005) . Annotations: ***significant at 1%-level, **significant at 5%-level, *significant at 10%-level. P-values in brackets are based on robust t-statistics (corrected for correlations within country cells and within firm cells). Dependent variable: W_ROA. All regressions contained a full set of time and firm fixed effects; coefficients are not reported. W_DEBT_RATIO and W_ROA have been winsorized. To avoid losing firms with zero employment, sales, or fixed assets in some year, I added a small constant before taking logs. For sake of presentation, logs have been entered in one tenth of a percent.
According to Proposition 1, the effect of co-owners on the impact of a change in tax rates is unclear. Models (3) and (4) include variables that are constructed by interacting the German and the foreign tax rates with the dummy WHOLLY. The objective is to empirically investigate whether co-ownership matters for the size of the tax effects. The effect of ownership on the size of the tax effects turns out to be not only theoretically undetermined but also empirically insignificant. Finally, the insignificance of WHOLLY does not suggest that the net of tax profitability changes if firms have a change from partial to full ownership 18 by a foreign investor and this is confirmed by employing a formal F-test using all variables in which the variable WHOLLY is included (p-values are 36% and 54% in equations (3) and (4)).
The profitability of German outbound FDI
I now turn to the outbound side of German FDI. Given the high German tax rates a major concern is that German multinationals have an incentive to shift profits abroad to repatriate these profits as a tax free dividend. This is a concern that corresponds to the Case B in Section 3.
Of course a straightforward approach would be to test whether foreign taxes influence the pre-tax profitability of German owned foreign affiliates. The problem in doing so is that the Bundesbank database only contains net-of-tax profits. Therefore, it is impossible to identify whether a reduction in a foreign affiliate's observed return is due to a change in profit shifting activities or is simply caused by higher taxation at constant pre-tax earnings. However, there is another prediction of the model in Section 3 that indeed can be tested. If the incentives are to shift profits abroad, then, according to Proposition 2, coownership should lead to a reduced impact of the foreign tax rate if co-ownership by itself has no impact on profitability. This contrasts with the case in which co-investors have an incentive to resist to profit shifting and the cost of profit shifting was assumed to increase in the amount of profit shifting. Annotations: ***significant at 1%-level, **significant at 5%-level, *significant at 10%-level. P-values in brackets are based on robust t-statistics (corrected for correlations within country cells and within firm cells). Dependent variable: W_ROA. All regressions contained a full set of time and firm fixed effects; coefficients are not reported. W_ROA and W_DEBT-RATIO are winsorized versions of ROW and DEBT-RATIO. To avoid losing firms with zero employment, sales, or fixed assets in some years, I added a small constant before taking logs. For sake of presentation, logs have been entered in one tenth of a percent.
Like in Section 5, I concentrate on affiliates that on average show a positive profitability. Table 4 gives the summary statistics for important variables. As on the inbound side, the return on total assets shows a huge variation that is obviously unrelated to taxation and the regressions below will therefore use the winsorized variable W_ROA. CT is now characterizing the corporate tax rate applicable to profits of the German-owned affiliate abroad. Using the dummy WHOLLY that takes on the value one if the German investor holds a 100% participation, I created the variable CT_WHOLLY = CT * WHOLLY in addition to using the simple host country corporate income tax, CT. Of course, the impact 20 CT is expected to be negative: an increased tax rate should reduce the net of tax profitability as long as a potentially accompanying tax base broadening does not overcompensate the effect of tax cuts. 15 Proposition 2 suggests that the coefficient of CT_WHOLLY should also be negative reflecting that firms without co-investors find it easier to adapt to tax rate changes than other firms. Table 5 contains two regression results using fixed effects models. While model (2) contains a variable for the leverage of the affiliate, model (1) omits such a variable. Apart from this, there are no differences in the specifications.
Like in section 5, there is no evidence that the fact that a firm is wholly-owned correlates with profitability. The sign of CT is consistent with expectations: an increase in the tax rate of the host country reduces profitability. The coefficient is not significant, though, suggesting that a large fraction of the effects of rate reductions may be outweighed by accompanying tax base adjustments. The main variable of interest is CT_WHOLLY, which turns out to be negative and statistically significant at the 8 percent level in model (1).
In line with Proposition 2, this suggests that wholly-owned firms indeed do react more strongly than co-owned affiliates.
The German tax rate cannot be tested when time fixed effects are included as it is identical for all firms in a given year. The variable CTGER_WHOLLY measures the differential effect of the German tax rate for wholly owned affiliates as compared to nonwholly owned subsidiaries. It shows a positive sign but is not significant at conventional levels. This is consistent with the model that has not suggested a systematic correlation.
Unlike in the inbound sample, LN_EMPLOYMENT has a positive effect on profitability, while the control variables LN_SALES and LN_FIXEDASSETS have a corresponding sign: positive for sales and negative for the amount of fixed assets. 16 Finally, two variables are added that represent the macroeconomic situation in the host country. As a measure of the local performance off the real economy, GDPGROWTH enters positively:
affiliates in high growth countries are enjoying a significantly higher return on assets.
Besides real growth also the financial macroeconomic situation may affect profitability.
DOMPRIVCRED, which measures the domestic private credit to GDP ratio and captures the liquidity of local loan markets, does not show up to be significant.
If the negative coefficient of CT_WHOLLY is interpreted as evidence for profit shifting activities the question arises as to what extent this profit shifting may be due to a different financial structure. Since the dependent variable is a measure of the return on total assets, interest on additional debt, which an increased local tax rate may induce, will reduce profits and decrease this measure. Inclusion of a variable for the debt to asset ratio in model 
Summary
The paper has taken two approaches to identify profit shifting behavior. In a first step, it has looked at the correlation between the home country tax rate of a parent and the net of tax profitability of its German affiliate. The finding is compatible with profit shifting behavior.
For profitable affiliates the evidence suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the parent's home country tax rate leads to roughly half a percentage point increase in the profitability of the German affiliate.
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In a second step the paper has analyzed German outbound FDI. Given the high tax rates of German parents by international standards, the profitability of German-owned affiliates abroad may benefit from profit shifting. Since pre-tax profits are not observed in the German FDI data, the empirical test looks at whether the local tax rates of Germanowned affiliates have a stronger impact on wholly-owned affiliates. While such a differential effect seems to be present if leverage is excluded as an explanatory variable, the significance of the distinction between wholly-owned and partly-owned affiliates is blurred if leverage is entered in the regression.
